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Financial and Labor Market Determinants of Mortgage Delinquency Rates:
McLean County, 1985-2011
Abstract
It is generally understood that the 2007- 2009 recession in the United States had its roots in the real
estate market. To quote Schiller (2008): “a speculative bubble in the housing market (...) has now caused
ruptures among many other countries in the form of financial failures and a global credit crunch” (p. 1).
There is a growing body of literature on the economic impact of the bursting of this “speculative bubble”.
Efforts have been directed at examining how financial institutions have been impacted and at considering
different efforts to re-regulate this industry. As the economic recovery from this particular recession has
been slower than after previous contractions, particularly in terms of job creation, research efforts have
also focused on labor markets. In this paper, we examine the interplay between financial and labor market
factors and the real estate market at the local level. We study McLean County, Illinois, since this county,
while being the largest in the state in terms of square mileage, has a median income level and a home
ownership rate comparable to those of Cook County –where the City of Chicago is located.
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FINANCIAL AND LABOR MARKET
DETERMINANTS OF MORTGAGE DELINQUENCY RATES: MCLEAN COUNTY, IL, 1985-2011
Jake Mann
I. INTRODUCTION
It is generally understood that the 20072009 recession in the United States had its roots
in the real estate market. To quote Schiller (2008):
“a speculative bubble in the housing market (...)
has now caused ruptures among many other
countries in the form of financial failures and a
global credit crunch” (p. 1). There is a growing
body of literature on the economic impact of the
bursting of this “speculative bubble”. Efforts have
been directed at examining how financial institutions have been impacted and at considering
different efforts to re-regulate this industry. As the
economic recovery from this particular recession
has been slower than after previous contractions,
particularly in terms of job creation, research efforts have also focused on labor markets. In this
paper, we examine the interplay between financial and labor market factors and the real estate
market at the local level. We study McLean County, Illinois, since this county, while being the largest in the state in terms of square mileage, has a
median income level and a home ownership rate
comparable to those of Cook County –where the
City of Chicago is located.
As Marcano and Ruprah (2011) report, recent economic literature tends to cast the phenomenon of mortgage default, the precursor to
potential property foreclosure, as either an issue of
moral hazard or as an issue of inability to pay. Regarding the issue of moral hazard and mortgage
defaults significant attention has been devoted to
the study of why and when homeowners choose
to stop making their monthly mortgage payments. The premise that homeowners will “walk
away” from their properties when the value of the
mortgage is greater than the home price, a situation known as having “negative equity” or being
“underwater”, fits a crude cost-benefit analysis of
such a situation. Yet, Foote et al. (2008) find that
“contrary to popular belief, […] negative equity is
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for foreclosure” (p. 1). In fact, they report that fewer than

10 percent of homeowners experiencing negative equity on their homes eventually experience
foreclosure. Moreover, Mian and Sufi (2008) place
the onus of foreclosures on the lenders, as “the expansion in the supply of credit driven by disintermediation is responsible for the rapid increase in
new loan originations, house price appreciation,
and subsequent large increase in default rates”
(p. 4). Similar conclusions regarding lending standards and mortgage securitization are reached
by Nadauld and Sherlund (2009), Haughwout et
al. (2008), and Keys et al. (2008). The prevalence
of adjustable-rate mortgage instruments during
the build-up of the housing bubble also played a
central factor in the buildup of negative equity.
As Bucks et al. (2008) point out, borrowers with
adjustable-rate mortgages were much more likely to misunderstand the terms of their mortgage
contract than their peers. Particularly, they were
“likely to underestimate or to not know how much
their interest rates could change” (p. 1).
Regarding the issue of inability to pay and
mortgage defaults research efforts have been
focused on identifying the factors that prevent
the homeowners from making their monthly payments. Such factors can be broadly categorized
as either financial (e.g. interest rates on the mortgaged principal) or labor-market related (e.g.
the employment status of the homeowner). Previous real estate market crises informed the work
of Campbell and Dietrich (1983) and Deboer
and Conrad (1988), who found that unemployment rates are positively related to mortgage
and property tax delinquency levels respectively.
More recently, Mayer et al. (2009) find that “In areas with widespread increases in unemployment,
house prices generally decline; demand for housing falls as income drops and workers migrate to
other areas in search of jobs” (p. 42). Financial
factors have also been considered. Gerardi et al.
(2007) estimation results indicate that the shortterm London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and
unemployment rate are positively associated with
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foreclosure levels. Also, Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) find that at the outset of the 2006-2007
housing crisis the delinquency rate on fixed-rate
mortgages actually fell and that the ‘variable’
delinquency rate rose enough to cause a cumulative increase in the aggregate delinquency
rate.
We focus our study on the arguments related to the inability to pay, rather than on the
moral hazard argument, in order to address an
ongoing public policy argument: whether mortgage defaults are more strongly influenced by
the weakness in the labor market or by the actual
costs of financing the mortgages. The policy implications of this argument are enormous. If the
costs of mortgages are found to be more relevant
than, let’s say, the unemployment rate in explaining mortgage defaults, policy efforts should be
focused on facilitating debt re-financing; if the inverse is true, policy efforts should prioritize job-creation to stem the mortgage defaults and foreclosures. Cordell et al. (2008) offer their own answer
to this question when reporting that the “deadweight losses” derived from foreclosures could be
reduced with “loss mitigation” (i.e. re-financing).
We expect that an increase in either fixed
or variable interest rates decreases homeowners’
ability to make their mortgage payments, thus increasing delinquency rates. Changes in fixed and
variable mortgage interest rates should impact
homeowners in slightly different ways. A change
in the fixed interest rate will only affect newly
granted fixed-rate mortgages for either the acquisition of a new house or for the refinancing of
the current one. Homeowners already locked-in
with a fixed rate and not looking into re-financing
would not be affected. A change in the variable
interest rate, however, affects the current cost of
financing a house purchase financed through a
variable interest instrument. We also expect that
a deterioration of the general condition of the local labor market decreases homeowners’ ability
to make their mortgage payments, thus increasing delinquency rates. An increase in the local unemployment rate would signal a decrease in the
current average income from labor.
We focus our study on the McLean County housing market because it could be representative of statewide trends. With a population of
nearly 170,000 residents, mostly concentrated in
the adjacent City of Bloomington and Town of
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Normal, nearly 275,000 mortgage deeds have
been granted over the past 26 years. During most
of our period of analysis, 1985-2011, the mortgage
delinquency rate has wandered around a mean
value of 2.00 percent; yet starting in 2005 it began
to grow, peaking at a value above 9.00 percent
in 2010. The metropolitan unemployment rate has
also been increasing and the regional mortgage
financing costs have been at, or above, national
averages. As mentioned above, the County has
a housing market fairly representative of the rest
of the state. To begin with, it contains well defined
and distinct urban and a rural “submarkets”. Also,
the county’s average population per household
(2.46) and homeownership rate (67.70 percent)
are within a five percent margin of the national
average values.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows: Section 2 describes the data and methodology, examining the stationarity of the series;
Section 3 identifies the best-fitting linear regressions used to examine the behavior of mortgage
delinquency rates, discussing our findings; lastly,
Section 4 presents conclusions and outlines policy
implications.
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In McLean County, mortgage delinquencies are registered through the issuances of a lis
pendens, which are notices informing the grantee
of a mortgage that the grantor’s payments are
90 days past due. These notices are filed with the
County’s Recorder’s Office and are accessible
through an online database. By dividing the number of lis pendens filings by the total number of
mortgage deeds issued, the monthly delinquency rate is computed. Our sample period starts in
January 1985 and ends in December 2011: a total
of 310 observations. Our sample period contains
a total of 274,310 mortgage deeds and 5,887 lis
pendens, resulting in an average delinquency
rate of 2.15 percent. As seen in Figure 1 on the
next page, the series displays a period of relative stability between 1985 and 2004, when the
monthly delinquency rate oscillates between 1.50
and 2.00 percent. The evolution of the twelvemonth moving average of the mortgage delinquency rate suggests a change in the long-term
trend by the end of 2005.
National interest rates are obtained from
the FRED database maintained by the St. Louis
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Federal Reserve Bank. These rates represent an
average of the borrowing costs in the United
States. Regional interest rates are obtained from
the primary Mortgage Market Survey conducted
by the federal agency Freddie Mac. These rates
represent borrowing costs within the North Central region, comprised of the states of Illinois, Ohio,
Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa,
North Dakota and South Dakota. We compile
both the 30-Year Fixed Rate Mortgage Average
and the 1-Year Adjustable Rate Average. Figure
2 compares national and regional fixed interest
rates. Figure 3 compares national and regional
variable rates. In both cases, secular declining
trends are easily observable. Although the fixed
rate is generally higher than the variable rate, this
difference has ebbed and flowed dramatically in
the last decade. In fact, during the most recent
recession both rates were effectively identical.
In our sample period regional fixed interest rates
have been an average of 0.06 percentage points
above the national value. Similarly, regional variable interest rates have exceeded national values by an average of 0.15 percent. In December
2011, the end of our sample, the national fixed
rate rested at 3.96 percent while the national variable rate was 2.79 percent. In this same month,
the regional fixed rate was 3.97 percent while the
regional variable rate was 3.06 percent.
Labor market indicators for McLean
County are obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ Metropolitan Area Survey. The compiled
series, the unemployment rate and the number of
unemployed workers, display similar cyclical behavior. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show that both labor
market indicators declined between 1990 and
2000, with the unemployment rate reaching a
low of 2.2 percent in 1998. Increasing, afterward,
the unemployment rate peaked at 5.2 percent
in 2005 before declining once again –this time to
3.9 percent in 2007. The latest nation-wide economic contraction has brought the county-level
unemployment rate to its highest in 20 years: 9.1
percent.
In order to determine what structural relationship may link financial and labor market
variables with the mortgage delinquency rate,
we will estimate several linear regression models
through Ordinary Least Squares. First, we will study
the impact of labor and financial variables on
the mortgage delinquency rate separately and
then we will combine them into a single regression

equation. The first step in our model-building effort
is to determine the order of integration of each
series: if a series is integrated of order zero, I(0), it
follows that it is stationary in levels. We compute
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistic
to determine the presence of a unit root in the
series. Following econometric convention, we first
compute the natural logarithmic value of the series in order to induce linearity. Table 1 reports the
results of the ADF tests of the variables in log-levels
(top section) and in first-order differences of the
log-levels (bottom section). Except in the case of
the mortgage delinquency rate we fail to reject
the null hypothesis that any of the series in loglevels has a unit root within a 95 percent confidence interval. We will put forward the argument
that the pseudo-stationary behavior of the mortgage delinquency rate between 1985 and 2005
influences the value of the ADF test statistic for the
whole sample period. When the first-order differences of the log-level values are considered the
reported ADF test statistics strongly reject the null
hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in any of
the series. Thus, we conclude that all the series are
integrated of order one, I(1), and that they should
be incorporated into our subsequent regression
efforts in terms of growth rates.
In order to check the robustness of our
findings we also compute the Kwiatkowski-PhillipsSchmidt-Shim (KPSS) test statistic to directly ascertain the potential stationarity of the series. Table
2 reports the results of the KPSS tests of the variables in log-levels (top section) and in first-order
differences of the log-levels (bottom section). In
the case of the mortgage delinquency rate and
the labor market indicators we strongly reject the
null hypothesis that, in log-levels, these series are
stationary; in the case of the financial market indicators we fail to reject the null hypothesis of stationarity within a 95 percent confidence interval.
When the first-order differences of the log-level
values are considered the reported KPSS test statistics allow us not to reject the null hypothesis of
stationarity for all the series. As above, we conclude that all the series are integrated of order
one, I(1), and that they should be incorporated
into our subsequent regression efforts in terms of
growth rates.
III. ESTIMATION RESULTS
We now turn to estimating a structural
model of county-level mortgage delinquency
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rates as a function of labor and financial market
factors. We study each of these sets of factors
separately and then combine them in order to
present the best-fitting linear regression model. We
employ an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methodology to estimate the parameters of these families
of models.
Our first set of estimating equations relates
the mortgage delinquency rate with labor market
factors. Besides the growth rate in the number of
unemployed workers and the growth rate in the
unemployment rate we considered the growth
rate in the number of employed workers as a potential explanatory variable. Because none of
our estimation formulations including this last variable yielded any significant result we chose not
to include this equation in our discussion of results.
Table 3 presents the estimation results of Model A
and Model B. In both models we incorporate a
lagged (t-1) value of the dependent variable as
an independent variable in order to capture the
concept of persistence in the behavior of mortgage delinquency rates. The regression parameter associated with this variable is highly significant
and almost identical across model specifications.
Its negative sign indicates that an increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency rate during
any given month is followed the next month by a
decrease (increase) in the mortgage delinquency rate. For example, when the mortgage delinquency rate increases by 10 percent during the
previous month we should expect a 3.63 (on average) percentage decrease in its value this month.
Thus, the mortgage delinquency rate does not
increase continually. We also include a dummy
variable in order to capture an abnormally large
drop in the value of the mortgage delinquency
rate during the early months of 1992: during the
first quarter of the year the number of recorded lis
pendens notices was less than three a month. We
attribute these low values to either a clerical issue
related to the recording the notices or to a possible change in the legal process regarding the
issuing of a lis pendens notice itself. The parameter associated with this dummy variable is highly
significant and, as should be expected, negative
in sign.
Model A examines the relationship between the county-level mortgage delinquency
rate and the metropolitan area unemployment
rate. Due to the delay between the time a homeowner becomes unemployed and the time a
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mortgage is considered to be in default – recall
that in the State of Illinois a mortgage is in default
after 90 days of non-payment – we lag this variable by four (4) periods. The regression parameter
associated with this variable is highly significant
and positive in sign. We find that a one percent
increase (decrease) in the unemployment rate
four months ago translates into a 0.70 percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency
rate during the current month. Lastly, Model B
examines the relationship between the countylevel mortgage delinquency rate and the metropolitan area number of unemployed individuals.
For the same reasons discussed above, we lag
this variable by four (4) periods. The regression
parameter associated with this variable is highly
significant and positive in sign. We find that a one
percent increase (decrease) in the number of
unemployed individuals four months ago translates into a 0.76 percent increase (decrease) in
the mortgage delinquency rate during the current month. We hypothesize that a change in
the number of unemployed workers has a larger
impact on the mortgage delinquency rate than
a change in the unemployment rate due to the
structure of the local labor market. Due to the limited range of horizontal mobility in terms of potential employers in the county we expect that when
a worker becomes unemployed she or he leaves
the area in order to become occupied in a similar
activity. Thus, when the actual number of unemployed workers residing in the area increases, its
impact on mortgage delinquency rates is larger
than that of an identical increase in the area unemployment rate. The explanatory power of our
linear regression efforts focused on labor market
factors yield very similar R-squares: we explain (on
average) 23 percent of the variance in the rate
of growth of the delinquency rate. The residual
diagnostics yield mixed results. Although we can
strongly reject the null hypothesis of heteroskedasticity in the residuals, we cannot conclude
definitely that the regression residuals are not autocorrelated or that they are normally distributed.
Our second set of estimating equations relates
the mortgage delinquency rate with national and
regional financial market factors. Table 4 presents
the estimation results of Model C and Model D. As
before, in both models we incorporate a lagged
(t-1) value of the dependent variable as an independent variable in order to capture the concept of persistence in the behavior of mortgage
delinquency rates. Our findings are almost identical to those presented above and we will refer
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the reader to that section of the paper in order to
economize space. The dummy variable discussed
above is also incorporated in these models.
Model C examines the relationship between the county-level mortgage delinquency
rate and national-level fixed and variable interest
rates. Due to the delay between the time fixed
interest rates change and the time a homeowner
notices changes in her or his potential mortgage
financing costs we lag this variable by two (2)
periods. The regression parameter associated
with this variable is highly significant and positive in sign. We find that a one percent increase
(decrease) in the national-level fixed interest rate
on mortgages two months ago translates into a
2.71 percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency rate during the current month.
Somehow, surprisingly, we cannot establish any
significant statistical relationship between the
national-level variable interest rate on mortgages
and the county-level mortgage delinquency rate.
We put forward the hypothesis that the local real
estate market, while moving along with national
trends of ballooning activity between 2003 and
2007, did not share the “bubble” qualities associated with large volumes of adjustable-rate mortgages prevalent in other areas. Therefore, only a
small fraction of local homeowners was exposed
to the variable financing costs brought about by
these financial instruments. Lastly, Model D examines the relationship between the county-level
mortgage delinquency rate and regional-level
fixed and variable interest rates. For the same reasons discussed above, we lag this variable by two
(2) periods. The regression parameter associated
with this variable is highly significant and positive
in sign. We find that a one percent increase (decrease) in the regional-level fixed interest rate on
mortgages two months ago translates into a 2.27
percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency rate during the current month. Again,
we cannot establish any significant statistical relationship between the variable interest rate on
mortgages and the mortgage delinquency rate,
even though in this case we consider regionallevel variable interest rates. We will refer the
reader to the argument we put forward above.
The explanatory power of our linear regression
efforts focused on financial market factors yield
very similar R-squares: we explain (on average)
21 percent of the variance in the rate of growth
of the delinquency rate. The residual diagnostics
yield mixed results. Although we can strongly re-

ject the null hypothesis of heteroskedasticity in the
residuals, we cannot conclude definitely that the
regression residuals are not autocorrelated or that
they are normally distributed.
Our final estimation effort combines labor
and financial market factors. Besides the one-period lagged value of the growth rate in the mortgage delinquency rate and the event dummy discussed above we include the growth rates in the
regional fixed interest rate on mortgages and in
the area-level number of unemployed. As before,
we lag these variables in order to capture the delay in the reaction of the mortgage delinquency
rate that follows a change in both labor market
and mortgage financing conditions. The regression parameters associated with these variables
are highly significant and positive in sign. We note
that when considered simultaneously the magnitude of the parameter linking the number of unemployed with the mortgage delinquency rate
increases (by 2.33 percent) while the magnitude
of the parameter linking the fixed interest rate on
mortgages with the mortgage delinquency rate
decreases (by 17.66 percent). Nevertheless, the
impact of changes in financial factors is 2.38 times
larger than the impact of changes in labor market
factors. In fact, a 10 percent increase (decrease)
in the fixed interest rate on mortgages translates
into an 18.69 percent increase (decrease) in the
mortgage delinquency rate, while a 10 percent
increase (decrease) in the number of unemployed individuals translates into a 7.85 percent
increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency rate. This regression yields the highest R-square
of all of our models: we are able to explain 24 percent of the variance in the rate of growth of the
delinquency rate. Finally, the residual diagnostics
yield mixed results. Although we can strongly reject the null hypothesis of heteroskedasticity in the
residuals, we cannot conclude definitely that the
regression residuals are not autocorrelated or that
they are normally distributed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our study of the behavior of the mortgage
delinquency rate in McLean County, IL attempts
to explain it as a function of several different factors. We consider, independently and jointly, labor
market indicators such as the number of unemployed and the unemployment rate and financial
market indicators such as the 30-year fixed and
1-year variable mortgage interest rates. Both na-
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tional-level and regional-level mortgage interest
rates are, alternatively, examined as potential explanatory variables. We find that the OLS regression yielding the best overall fit is capable of explaining 24 percent of the variance in the growth
rate of the mortgage delinquency rate over time.
More importantly, we find that when the number
of unemployed individuals or the fixed mortgage
interest rate change, even by the same percentage amount, the reaction of the mortgage delinquency rate is remarkably different in terms of
order of magnitude. In our sample period the impact of changes in financial factors on the county-level mortgage delinquency rate is 2.38 times
larger than the impact of changes in labor market factors.
This empirical finding is potentially useful to
address an ongoing local debate on whether it
is the job losses associated with the latest recession or the onerous financing terms of properties
suddenly devalued by the collapse of the real estate market that is resulting in larger numbers of
mortgage defaults and, eventually, foreclosures.
Our conclusion that financial market indicators
play a larger role than labor market indicators
could help focus the policy responses to the ongoing problem of property foreclosures. We will
argue that policy efforts in this area should emphasize loss-mitigation (i.e. refinancing) instead of
job-creation. In that light, we are happy to report
that a lender-borrower mediation process has
been recently implemented as part of the legal
foreclosure proceedings in the local court system. On the other hand, our research leads us to
believe that recent reductions in the unemployment rate, both at the national and local levels,
would not have as much of a dampening effect
on the number of county-level mortgage defaults
as many would expect. Finally, we will point out
the fact that although local and regional policymakers may be able to influence, to a degree,
labor market conditions in the area their degree
of influence over financial market conditions is severely constrained. In other words, regulation and
control of financial market conditions is mostly
conducted at the national level, where local and
regional interests and priorities are multiple and
often conflicting.
In terms of potential avenues of future research we propose to study the time series characteristics of the fillings of lis pendens notices by
themselves. A visual examination of this series
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seems to indicate a semi-continuous process: a
month with a relatively high number of lis pendens
notices filed is frequently followed by a month
with a relatively low number of lis pendens notices
filed. The resulting seesaw plot of the series may
provide a clue regarding the prevalent rejection
of the null hypothesis of autocorrelation in the
regression residuals. A potential manipulation of
these series through some sort of moving average
or filtering process could merit future research efforts.
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APPENDIX

Fig. 1. Histogram of Delinquency Rate and 12-Month Moving Average

Fig. 2. Histogram of Regional and National 30-Year Fixed Mortgage
Interest Rate
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Fig. 3. Histogram of Regional and National 1-Year Variable Mortgage Interest Rates

Fig. 4. Histogram of Bloomington-Normal Metropolitan Unemployment Rate
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Fig. 5. Histogram of Number of Unemployment Individuals in the
Bloomington-Normal Metropolitan
Table 1: Results of the ADF Test for Unit Roots
Constant+trend

Significance

Delinquency rate

-3.8881

**

Unemployment rate

-2.3174

Unemployed

-2.2151

Fixed interest rate, regional

-3.2723

*

Fixed interest rate, national

-3.2888

*

Variable interest rate, regional

-1.5903

Variable interest rate, national

-1.7320

Variables in logarithms
The null hypothesis is non-stationarity

Critical values (%)
1

-3.9875

5

-3.4242

10

-3.1351

Variables in logarithms and first order
differences
The null hypothesis is non-stationarity
Delinquency rate
Unemployment rate

-11.18235

***

-3.6219

**

Unemployed

-3.8281

**

Fixed interest rate, regional

-12.8864

***

Fixed interest rate, national

-12.8054

***

Variable interest rate, regional

-14.8323

***

Variable interest rate, national

-10.3244

***

Critical values (%)

62

1

-3.9875

5

-3.4242

10

-3.1351
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Table 2: Results of the KPSS Test for Stationarity
Constant+trend

Significance

Variables in logarithms
The null hypothesis is stationarity
Delinquency rate

0.3899

Unemployment rate

0.3755

Unemployed

0.3714

Fixed interest rate, regional

0.0765

***

Fixed interest rate, national

0.0706

***

Variable interest rate, regional

0.0859

***

Variable interest rate, national

0.0836

***

Critical values (%)
1

0.2160

5

0.1460

10

0.1190

Variables in logarithms and first order
differences
The null hypothesis is stationarity
Delinquency rate

0.1223

**

Unemployment rate

0.0926

***

Unemployed

0.1076

***

Fixed interest rate, regional

0.0514

***

Fixed interest rate, national

0.0485

***

Variable interest rate, regional

0.0924

***

Variable interest rate, national

0.0845

***

Critical values (%)
1

0.2160

5

0.1460

10

0.1190

Table 3: Estimation Results Model A And Model B
Dependent variable: % D in the Delinquency Rate (t=0)
n = 259
Model A
Constant

Model B

0.0139

0.0132

(0.4606)

(0.4375)

% D in Delinquency Rate

-0.3637***

-0.3628***

(t - 1)

(-6.6027)

(-6.5951)

% D in Unemployed Population

0.7675***

(t - 4)

(2.7845)

% D in Unemployment Rate

0.7022***

(t - 4)

(2.6791)

Dummy variable

-2.6546***

-2.6737***

(January 1992)

(-5.4579)

(-5.5040)

R-squared

0.2292

0.2309

P (F-stat)

0.0000

0.0000

White’s test (heteroskedasticity)

0.0960

0.0741

Breusch-Godfrey (autocorrelation)

0.0000

0.0000

Jarque-Bera (normality)

0.0158

0.0145

Residual Diagnostic Tests, P-values
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Table 4: Estimation Results Model C and Model D
Dependent variable: % D in the Delinquency Rate (t = 0)
n = 305
Model C
Constant

Model D

0.0258

0.0223

(0.8340)

(0.7287)

% D in Delinquency Rate

-0.3888***

-0.3853***

(t - 1)

(-7.5430)

(-7.5220)

% D in National Fixed Interest Rate

2.7128***

(t - 2)

(2.6631)

% D in National Variable Interest Rate
(t - 3)

1.0225
(0.8562)

% D in Regional Fixed Interest Rate

2.2710***

(t - 2)

(2.1401)

% D in Regional Variable Interest Rate

1.1483

(t -1)

(1.0855)

Dummy variable

-2.6319***

-2.620***

(January 1992)

(-4.9260)

(-4.9016)

R-squared

0.2176

0.2161

P (F-stat)

0.0000

0.0000

White’s test (heteroskedasticity)

0.1784

0.1893

Breusch-Godfrey (autocorrelation)

0.0000

0.0000

Jarque-Bera (normality)

0.0000

0.0000

Residual Diagnostic Tests, P-values

Table 5: Regression Result for Model E
Dependent variable: % D in Delinquency Rate (t = 0)
n = 259
Model E
Constant

0.1963
(0.6506)

% D in Delinquency Rate

-0.3709***

(t - 1)

(-6.7568)

% D in Regional Fixed Interest rate

1.8698**

(t - 3)

(1.9049)

% D in Number of Unemployed

0.7854***

(t - 4)

(2.8624)

Dummy variable

-2.6450***

(January 1992)

(-5.4704)

R-squared

0.2417

P (F-stat)

0.000
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White’s test (heteroskedasticity)

0.0703

Breusch-Godfrey (autocorrelation)

0.0000

Jarque-Bera (normality)

0.0075
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